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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO
GENESIS GOLF BUILDERS, INC.,
formerly known as National Golf
Builders, Inc., a Nevada
corporation,

)
DOCKET NO. 44584-2016
)
)
(Bonner County
)
Case CV-2009-1810)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
)
PEND OREILLE BONNER DEVELOPMENT,
)
LLC, a Nevada limited liability
)
company; et al.
)
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________ )
)
VALIANT IDAHO, LLC, an Idaho limited )
liability company,
)
)
Third Party Plaintiff-Cross
)
Claimant-Respondent,
)
v.
)
)
JV L.L.C., an Idaho limited
)
liability company,
)
)
Defendant-Third Party
)
Plaintiff-Cross Defendant)
Appellant.
)
__________________________________ )
__________________________________________________
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
__________________________________________________
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner
__________________________________________________
THE HONORABLE BARBARA BUCHANAN, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING
__________________________________________________
John A. Finney
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A.
120 East Lake Street, Ste 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT JV

Richard L. Stacey
McConnell Wagner Sykes
& Stacey PLLC
827 East Park Blvd, Ste 201
Boise, ID 83712
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT VALIANT
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REBUTTAL ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
I.

JV’S PLEADINGS, RESPONSES, AND MOTIONS RAISED THE TAX
REDEMPTION SUBROGATION CLAIM, INCLUDING TITLE THEORY AND LIEN
THEORY
A.

JV’s Pleading Raised Subrogation Under Title Theory Or
Lien Theory

On September 15, 2015, JV filed its JV L.L.L.’s [sic –
L.L.C.’s] Special Appearance Contesting Jurisdiction; And JV
L.L.C.’s Answer To Complaint; And JV L.L.C.’s Answer To Valiant
Idaho, LLC’s Counterclaim, Cross-Claim And Third Party Complaint
For Judicial Foreclosure; And JV L.L.C.’s Cross-Claim; And JV
L.L.C.’s Third Party Complaint, which was verified by JV (herein
“JV’s Claims Pleading”).

(R. Vol VII p 784-843).

JV

specifically pled for relief based upon the tax redemption payment
by JV to Bonner County and specifically asserted a first priority
lien as to the property redeemed.

There are several provisions in

JV’s Claims Pleading relevant to the issues on appeal.
Paragraph 51 of JV’s Claims Pleading (R. Vol VII p 795-796),
raised the Lien Theory, and provided as follows:
51.

JV L.L.C. admits paragraph 44, except denies that

Valiant paid “to redeem the Idaho Club Property”, as Valiant
paid only to redeem a portion of the Idaho Club Property
real property.

JV, had previous in time to Valiant, paid

Bonner County to redeem and did redeem a portion of the
Idaho Club Property being a portion of the property referred
to as Moose Mountain.

Valiant did not redeem from Bonner

County, nor did Valiant pay real estate taxes on the Moose
Mountain real estate that was redeemed by JV.

The tax

parcels and real estate redeemed by JV are as stated in JV’s
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Notice of Redemption, dated July 1, 2014, a copy of which is
attached hereto as JV L.L.C.’s Exhibit D.

JV paid the

Bonner County Tax Collector for the 2008 through 2014 real
estate taxes pursuant to its redemption in the sum of
$140,999.86, paid July 1, 2014.

JV L.L.C. claims the real

estate tax redemption payment as the first priority lien as
to the real estate redeemed by JV.
Paragraph 63 of JV’s Claims Pleading (R. Vol VII p 797),
raised the Title Theory, and provided as follows:
63.

JV L.L.C. admits the dollar amount of payment by

Valiant as alleged in paragraph 55; however JV denies the
remainder as Valiant may not have been a party entitled to
“redeem” and the stated payment was not “to redeem the Idaho
Club Property” as JV had previously redeemed a portion of
the Idaho Club Property.

JV has title to the property it

redeemed as real estate pursuant to the recorded Tax
Redemption Deed from Bonner County to JV on the redeemed
Moose Mountain Property.
Paragraph 74 of JV’s Claims Pleading (R. Vol VII p 798),
provided as follows:
74.

JV L.L.C. admits paragraph 66, except Valiant may

not have been entitled to redeem and JV’s redemption is
superior to Valiant.
Paragraph 100 of JV’s Claims Pleading (R. Vol VII p 802803), made reference to the document attached thereto as Exhibit D
JV’s Notice of Redemption, dated July 1, 2014.

The said Exhibit

D. Notice of Redemption was attached (R. Vol VII p 827-828).
Paragraph 108 of JV’s Claims Pleading (R. Vol VII p 805-806)
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contains “JV L.L.C.’S Prayer for Relief”, and provided in
subparagraph 5, as follows:
5.

For Judgment in the amount of $140,999.86

paid by JV to redeem from the Bonner County Tax Deed and for
a first priority lien against the redeemed real estate.
JV’s Claims Pleading raised the issues and claims of both
the Title Theory and the Lien Theory.

B.

VALIANT’S Motion Sought Relief On The Lien Theory

On January 20, 2015, VALIANT filed its Valiant Idaho, LLC’s
Motion For Summary Judgment Against JV, L.L.C., North Idaho
Resorts, LLC, and VP, Incorporated and its supporting pleadings
(R. Vol XIV p 1720-1746).

In VALIANT’s Memorandum In Support Of

Valiant Idaho, LLC’s Motion For Summary Judgment Against JV,
L.L.C., North Idaho Resorts, LLC, and VP, Incorporated, filed
January 20, 2015 (R. Vol XIV p 1725-1746) VALIANT argued that
Idaho Code § 45-114 was applicable and that Idaho Code § 45-105
was applicable.

VALIANT in part II. Statement of Facts, subparts

A.5. and A.6. of its memorandum set forth its alleged facts
regarding its July 7, 2014 redemption payment and the Redemption
Deed issued in favor of VALIANT and argued that “Pursuant to the
Seventh Cause of Action alleged in the Valiant Complaint, Valiant
seeks to foreclose the Redemption Deed and for an adjudication
that Valiant’s interest in the real property therein is superior
and senior in right to any claimed interest in the real property
by Claimants.”

(R. Vol XIV p 1731-1732).

Valiant in its part IV.

Argument, subpart E. of its memorandum specifically set forth the
provisions of Idaho Code § 45-114 and argued that the priority as
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to the amount paid for redemption for a tax deed was “at a
minimum” that of the existing debts priority, and by that argument
asserted that a greater priority based upon the subrogation
statute Idaho Code § 45-114 to the tax lien and interest of Bonner
County. (R. Vol XIV p 1742-1743).

C.

JV’s Opposition To Summary Judgment Set Forth The Lien
Theory and Title Theory

On February 2, 2015, JV filed in opposition to VALIANT’s
motion for summary judgment, its JV L.L.C.’s Memorandum In
Opposition To Valiant Idaho, LLC’s Motion For Summary Judgment.
(R. Vol XIX p 2076 – Vol XX p. 2322).

In that opposition, JV

specifically argued for priority over Valiant Idaho based upon the
tax redemption payment by JV to Bonner County.

JV set forth

argument regarding the Notice of Redemption and the Redemption
Deed (R. Vol XIX p 2099) and attached the Notice of Redemption as
Exhibit L and the Redemption Deed as Exhibit M (R. Vol XX p 23012307).

D.

The District Court Identified The Redemption Deed
Arguments Made By VALIANT

The District Court, in its Memorandum Decision & Order
Granting Valiant Idaho, LLC’s Motion For Summary Judgment Against
JV, L.L.C., North Idaho Resorts, LLC, and VP, Incorporated,
entered April 14, 2015, identified VALIANT’s argument that it not
only relied upon being able to add the tax redemption payment to
its debt, but that it “also” sought to foreclose pursuant to the
tax redemption deed. (R. Vol XXII p 2566).

The District Court

specifically ruled that “VALIANT’s Redemption Deed Has Priority
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Over JV“ setting forth, but not analyzing, the provisions of
Idaho Code § 45-113 (lienholder’s right to redeem), Idaho Code §
45-114 (inferior lienholder’s right to redeem and right to be
subrogated).

E.

JV Sought Reconsideration Relief And Affirmative Motion
For Subrogation Based Upon Title Theory And Lien Theory

On July 30, 2015, JV filed its JV L.L.C.’s Motion To Alter,
Amend, And Reconsider The Court’s Memorandum Decision And Order
Re: JV L.L.C.’s Motions To Reconsider, And JV L.L.C.’s Motion For
Partial Summary Judgment For Affirmative Relief Concerning JV
L.L.C.’s Redemption Deed And As To Valiant’s Redemption Deed; And
Request For Hearing. (R. Vol XXV p 2967-2980).

This motion by JV

set forth the arguments brought forward on this appeal regarding
JV being subrogated to the position of Bonner County by the
redemption payment and the Redemption Deed, whether as owner by
the failure of Valiant to subsequently redeem within 14 months
(“Title Theory”) or by having the first priority encumbrance as to
the amount paid in redemption (“Lien Theory”).

There is no need

to fully reproduce the arguments in the motion in this brief, as
the pleading is in the record on appeal, but JV highlights certain
portions of the argument.
JV argued that “1. Upon the Notice of Redemption, payment of
$140,999.86 and by the Redemption Deed, JV became subrogated to
the first (1st) lien position previously held by Bonner County for
unpaid delinquent taxes under Tax Deed (Exhibit I):....” (R. Vol
XXV p 2971-2972).

JV set forth the relevant statutory provisions

of Idaho Code § 45-114 and argued that “Therefore, as part of JV’s
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mortgage foreclosure, JV is entitled to enforce the tax redemption
payment of $140,999.86, on the 5 tax parcels of JV’s Redemption
Deed in the subrogated first lien position of the Bonner County
tax lien.” (R. Vol XXV p 2973).

These arguments were in regards

to the Lien Theory of the subrogated interest.
JV further argued that “JV MAY HAVE RECEIVED TITLE BY ITS
REDEMPTION DEED.”

(R. Vol XXV p 2974).

In the motion, JV argued

that Valiant did not effectuate a subsequent redemption from JV
during the 14 month statutory period.

These arguments were in

regards to the Title Theory of the subrogated interest held by JV.
JV set forth in its motion an “IN CONCLUSION” section
summarizing the arguments that by its mortgage, its redemption
payment, its redemption deed, and Valiant’s redemption deed (which
did not include the property in JV’s redemption deed) that JV was
subrogated to the first lien position of Bonner County as to the 5
parcels described in the Redemption Deed.

(R. Vol XXV p 2978).

JV sought affirmative relief by its motion, which was denied
by the District Court, without any additional analysis or
consideration of the statutory subrogation rights.

F.

JV Thoroughly Raised And Asserted Its Statutory Right
Of Subrogation Under The Alternatives Of Title Theory
And Lien Theory

It cannot be said that JV failed to raise its claims for
subrogation based upon payment of the tax redemption to the
interest of the County.

JV pled, opposed summary judgment, and

sought summary judgment on its statutory subrogation claim to the
priority interests of the County tax lien and deed.
Although both Valiant and JV raised the subrogation claims
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pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-114, and although the District Court
set forth the statute in its decisions, the District Court did not
analyze or give effect to the subrogation rights pursuant to the
statute to JV.

G.

JV Has A Statutory Right Of Subrogation And Merely
Adding The Amount Paid To The Inferior Interest Does
Not Afford Any Protection, Which Is Contrary To Statute
(And Equity)

While it is correct that the provisions of the various
mortgages provide for the addition for the payment of taxes to the
secured debt, and while Idaho Code § 45-105 does provide the
statutory basis for the same result, that does not mean that a
lender, in the event of several liens with varying priority, is
not afforded the protection and benefit of Idaho Code § 45-114.
The provision of Idaho Code § 45-105 provides for permissive, not
mandatory or exclusive, relief.

Idaho Code § 45-105, which uses

the term “may” rather than “shall” must be read in concert with
Idaho Code §§ 45-113 and 45-114.

Idaho Code § 45-105 provides as

follows:
45-105. SATISFACTION OF PRIOR LIEN. Where the holder of a
special lien is compelled to satisfy a prior lien for his
own protection, he may enforce payment of the amount so
paid by him, as a part of the claim for which his own lien
exists.
Idaho Code §§ 45-113 and 45-114 (underline emphasis added)
provide, as follows:
45-113. RIGHT TO REDEEM FROM LIEN. Every person, having
an interest in property subject to a lien, has a right to
redeem it from the lien, at any time after the claim is
due, and before his right of redemption is foreclosed.
45-114. RIGHTS OF JUNIOR LIENOR. One who has a lien
inferior to another, upon the same property, has a right:
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1. To redeem the property in the same manner as its
owner might, from the superior lien; and,
2. To be subrogated to all the benefits of the
superior lien, when necessary for the protection of his
interests upon satisfying the claim secured thereby.
These rights are in addition to merely adding the amount
paid to the existing indebtedness with the existing priority.
These rights to be subrogated are paramount when there are
“junior lienors” and these rights protect the junior lienor that
redeems with new money, and protects the new money by subrogation
to the interest with the greater priority.
Pursuant to subrogation, the junior lienor, here JV, is
substituted into the place of the County, with either Title or a
Priority Lien.
The circumstances involving multiple lienors distinguishes
the issues in this matter, and the subrogated rights of JV to the
interest of Bonner County, from the facts of Hardy v. McGill, 137
Idaho 280 (2002) and the case of Trusty v. Ray, 73 Idaho 232
(1952) cited by VALIANT.

Neither case involved facts where

multiple lienors existed or where a junior lienor redeemed, and
by statute is subrogated.

Those cases rejected the Title Theory

in the circumstance where there was only a single lienor and in
the circumstance where there was a dispute over the lien.

Those

cases did not address the multiple lienholder situation and did
not discuss the lien theory or the title theory based upon the
statutory subordination provision.

H.

JV Is Not Limited By The Title 63 Redemption Statutes

The provisions of Idaho Code § 63-1007 and § 63-1010 do not
provide for a specific remedy limiting the rights of the junior
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF - 8

lienor who exercised the right to redeem and pays new money to a
priority lienor to protect its junior interest.

Those statutes

do not limit the applicability of Idaho Code §§ 45-113 and 45114, and are in the same title and chapter as the provisions of
Idaho Code § 45-105 relied upon for the permissive right to add
the payment to the existing encumbrance.
Those provisions are silent as to the interest acquired by
the redemptioner from the conveyance of the Redemption Deed
issued from the County to the redemptioner (not issued to the
prior owner or record).

The statutory provisions of Idaho Code §

45-114 are the specific applicable statutes.

II.

JV Has A Subrogated Priority Interest

In summary, the relief requested is for the subrogated
interest of JV to be given effect by reversing the District
Court’s findings and conclusion, and last entered judgment and
last entered decree of foreclosure, and ordering one of the
alternative reliefs sought, specifically either:
1.

Under the title theory that JV, by the Redemption

Deed and the passing of 14 months, holds fee simple absolute
title free and clear of any of the interests held by VALIANT
(and any other claimants) in the real estate redeemed; or,
2.

Under the lien theory that JV holds the super first

priority lien of the County for the amount of the taxes paid
in redemption, and that JV is entitled to foreclose upon the
same for the amount paid plus interest, with a first priority
lien as compared to the interest acquired by VALIANT (and any
other claimants) by the Sheriff’s foreclosure sale process on
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the real property described in the Redemption Deed.
This relief effectuates the subrogated interests of JV to
the County’s interest by the Tax Deed and Redemption Deed
process.

This relief affords JV as an inferior lienor the

protection provided for in the applicable statutes.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING COSTS AGAINST JV
In the Appellant’s Brief, JV correctly set forth the total

costs awarded to VALIANT of $41,479.69 and that the District
Court’s arbitrarily allocated 37.5% against JV, which means that
portion was not awarded against the secured debt enforced by the
encumbrance upon the real property.

JV argued that all the costs

of the foreclosure properly awarded should all be awarded against
the indebtedness for foreclosure against the real property
security.
JV also addressed specific items, a portion of which were
allocated against JV, by the District Court’s arbitrary in toto
allocation rather than a cost by cost analysis and allocation.
In summary, the properly awardable costs of the foreclosure
should all be allocated to and added to the secured indebtedness
of POBD and not against JV.
vacated.

The award against JV should be

If any amount is properly awardable against JV, most of

the items sought should be disallowed as against JV.

III. THE SANCTIONS AGAINST JV AND ATTORNEY GARY FINNEY SHOULD BE
VACATED
I.R.C.P. 11(c)(2) provides that a motion for sanctions “...
must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be
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presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense,
contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected
within 21 days after service....”

This language conclusively

provides for a 21 day period to allow a party against whom a rule
11 violation is asserted, the opportunity to correct it.

The

arguments for interpretation brought forward by VALIANT would
totally remove the 21 day period from the rule.
As to the assertion that Gary Finney “in his personal
capacity” did not appeal, VALIANT recognizes the controlling
precedence of Smith v. Treasure Valley Seed Co., LLC, 161 Idaho
107 (2016) and its holding that an appeal signed by an attorney
which identifies as an issue on appeal an award of sanctions
against the attorney is sufficient.

There is no separate

“personal capacity” in which the appeal must be pursued.
At no time was JV and/or attorney Gary Finney given the
opportunity to withdraw or appropriately correct the challenged
filing within 21 days.
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The sanctions should be vacated.

CONCLUSION
The Appellant JV is entitled to relief vacating the Judgment
and the Decree of Foreclosure and remanding for JV to be
subrogated to the County’s tax deed interest under either the
title theory or the lien theory.

JV is entitled to have the

award of costs vacated and the costs disallowed.

JV and Gary

Finney are entitled to have the imposition of sanctions vacated.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _16 _ day of March, 2018.

_/s/__________________________
JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorney for Appellant JV

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this _16__ day of March, 2018, two
(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing, were served by
deposit in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and were addressed to:
Richard L. Stacey
McConnell Wagner Sykes
& Stacey PLLC
827 East Park Blvd, Ste 201
Boise, ID 83712
_/s/__________________________
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